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Abstract
This study capitalizes on a successful researcher–practitioner partnership to conduct
a systematic social observation (SSO) of police body-worn camera (BWC) footage in
Newark, NJ. To demonstrate the utility of BWCs as performance monitoring tools,
we measure officer adherence to procedural justice standards throughout use of force
events as mandated in the Newark Police Division’s updated policies pursuant to an
ongoing federal consent decree. Overall, a slim majority of use of force events are
procedurally just. However, results indicate several instances of policy noncompliance.
Results are discussed, and policy recommendations related to procedural justice policy
violations and BWCs for performance monitoring are provided.
Keywords
performance monitoring, use of force, body-worn camera, procedural justice,
systematic social observation

Introduction
Although the central focus of body-worn camera (BWC) research has primarily been
summative in nature (Lum et al., 2020), researchers have explored connections
between BWC use and indicators of procedural justice (e.g., McClure et al., 2017;
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McCluskey et al., 2019). In addition, Makin et al. (2020) demonstrate that BWC footage enables researchers to contextualize outcomes of police–citizen encounters and
other social events of interest. Thus, BWCs offer utility for performance monitoring to
assess adherence to various policing policies, including policies around procedural
justice. Providing a description of such utility constitutes a useful information product
for police departments seeking to reimagine performance management.
As such, we leverage the research benefits of BWC footage to conduct a systematic
social observation (SSO) of police use of force events in Newark, NJ. In May 2011,
the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division opened an investigation into the
Newark Police Division (NPD). The investigation found an unconstitutional pattern or
practice by the NPD in its use of physical force (U.S. Department of Justice Civil
Rights Division, 2014). In place of litigation, the city of Newark entered into a consent
decree with the Department of Justice. The consent decree required NPD to deploy
BWCs and update policies. Updated policies compel officers to engage in a range of
activities falling within a procedural justice framework during interactions with civilians. This study, an outgrowth of an applied partnership between the research team and
the NPD, uses BWCs as a performance monitoring tool to measure police officer
adherence to these updated policies.

Review of Relevant Literature
BWCs, Procedural Justice, and NPD Policies
Research on the effect of BWCs has developed at a much more rapid pace than most
(if not all) other police technologies (Lum et al., 2015; Piza, 2018). Lum and colleagues (2020) conducted a meta-analysis measuring the effect of BWCs on police
officer and citizen behavior as reported through 30 experiments and quasi-experiments. Results of the meta-analysis indicate that BWCs can reduce citizen complaints against police officers. Although the overall results did not find any changes
in officer use of force, moderator analyses found that BWCs are more likely to
reduce use of force when agencies highly restrict officers’ discretion pertaining to
camera activation.
There is a small, but growing body of research exploring connections between
BWCs and procedural justice (e.g., McClure et al., 2017; McCluskey et al., 2019).
Procedural justice generally refers to the “perceived fairness of the procedures involved
in decision-making and implementation, and the treatment people receive from the
authority” (Murphy et al., 2008, p. 139). With that said, scholars have emphasized a
distinction between perceptions of fairness and actual officer actions—the latter of
which is much more easily articulated in policing policies, more amenable to direct
observation by a third party, and less influenced by the personal biases of the targets
(Braga et al., 2014; McCluskey et al., 2019). Officer actions that adhere to a procedural justice framework include providing the public with explanations of police policies and practices, listening to citizen concerns, responding to citizen concerns, and
treating community members with respect and dignity (G. Wood et al., 2020).
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Much research has incorporated in-person SSO to measure procedural justice indicators during police–citizen interactions. Particularly relevant to this study, McCluskey
and colleagues (2019) conducted in-person SSO to measure the effect of BWCs on
officer adherence to procedural justice in Los Angeles. The authors measured 18 indicators of procedural justice, as identified by prior research. These indicators were then
collapsed into four separate components: participation, neutrality, dignity and respect,
and trustworthy motives. McCluskey et al. (2019) found that BWCs significantly
increased officer adherence to procedural justice standards in Los Angeles, and that
certain contextual factors (e.g., citizen behavior and race) influenced procedural justice at the incident level.
Officer adherence to procedural justice has predicted citizen perceptions of police
legitimacy (Mazerolle et al., 2013) and recent research has shown that procedural
justice training is associated with a reduction in use of force and complaints against
police (G. Wood et al., 2020). In contrast, when the public views agents of the law
unfavorably, the ability of such agents to maintain social order is lost (Kirk & Matsuda,
2011), and police officers who subscribe to a police culture in alignment with more
unjust practices are more likely to use force (Terrill et al., 2003). Lack of confidence
in the criminal justice system is described by Sampson and Bartusch (1998) as legal
cynicism, or a cultural belief that the law and law enforcers are illegitimate and unable
to ensure the safety of the public (see also Kirk & Papachristos, 2011).
Legal cynicism came to a head in Newark, NJ when, in May 2011, the U.S.
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division opened an investigation into the NPD
after receiving allegations of repeated civil rights violations by the agency. Among
many other conclusions, the investigation found an unconstitutional pattern or practice
by the NPD in its use of physical force (U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights
Division, 2014). Use of force by NPD was found to be unreasonable, underreported by
officers, and inadequately investigated. In place of litigation, the city of Newark
entered into a consent decree with the Department of Justice,
with the goals that police services delivered to the people of Newark fully comply with
the Constitution and the laws of the United States, promote public and officer safety, and
increase public confidence in the Newark Department of Public Safety and Newark
Police Division (collectively “NPD”) and its officers. (U.S. v. City of Newark, 2016, p. 1)

The consent decree required NPD to adopt a wide range of reforms, including the
deployment of BWCs and updating policies.
Many of the NPD’s updated policies include instructions to officers to engage in a
range of activities falling within the procedural justice framework during interactions
with civilians. One such policy is the Bias-Free Policing policy (NPD, 2017). The
purpose of this policy is to prevent discriminatory practices and ensure fair and
respectful treatment of citizens. The policy explicitly states that officers shall “Be
courteous, respectful, and professional. . . state the reason for the stop as soon as practical. . . [and] Answer any questions the citizen may have” (NPD, 2017, p. 4). Similarly,
the purpose of the updated use of force policy is to guide use of force practices and
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“ensure that Police Division members treat all persons with dignity and respect as they
execute the duties they have been entrusted to perform” (NPD, 2018b, p. 2). Procedural
justice–related officer activities described by this policy include providing subjects
with a reason for their arrest prior to the need for physical force, de-escalation of the
situation through verbal commands and information gathering, and recognizing that
officer demeanor (i.e., “tone and body language”) can influence escalation—resulting
in an increased likelihood of force being used (NPD, 2018b, p. 14). Finally, due to the
deployment of BWCs mandated by the consent decree, a BWC policy was developed.
Pertaining to principles of procedural justice, the BWC policy states that “members
shall notify the subject that the camera is recording at the earliest opportunity that is
safe and feasible” (NPD, 2018a, p. 4).

Police Reform and Performance Monitoring
In 1994, the U.S. Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act. This Act gave the U.S. Department of Justice the ability to enter into consent
decrees with jurisdictions when police departments engage in a pattern or practice of
conduct that violates the civil rights of civilians (Powell et al., 2017). Research has
shown that consent decrees can reduce the risk of civil rights complaints and improve
accountability processes and police officer training (Davis et al., 2005; Powell et al.,
2017). Furthermore, whereas consent decree outcomes have been found to dissipate
over time (see Chanin, 2014), persistent monitoring of key outcome measures can
increase long-term sustainability of effects, and consent decrees can result in police
adopting new, often data-driven, measures to track outputs mandated by the Department
of Justice (Morgan et al., 2017).
The use of consent decrees as a tool for police reform has grown in popularity,
particularly over the past 5 years. From 2015 to 2020, eight police departments were
placed under consent decrees (compared with seven over the previous 10 years; U.S.
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2017; 2020). With this increased popularity, affected police organizations have had to innovate to comply with the changes
imposed upon them by the Department of Justice. For example, the New Orleans
Police Department (NOPD) created a scorecard system to quickly track consent decree
compliance with BWC activation requirements by platoon level (Morgan et al., 2017).
With the success of the scorecard system in gaining compliance around BWC activation, NOPD began measuring a variety of indicators of consent decree compliance
with high frequency and built-up strong capacity for self-monitoring. In Newark, an
independent monitor has been tasked with ensuring implementation of and compliance with orders of the consent decree through audits, compliance reviews, and summative evaluations, and by analyzing a wide variety of data sources. As of this writing,
NPD has not yet reached full operational compliance, a term that signifies NPD has
satisfied a consent decree requirement by demonstrating routine adherence in its daily
operations.
In tandem with the oversight provided by consent decree monitors, the proliferation
of BWCs provides additional opportunities for in-depth analysis of police–citizen
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encounters recorded on video. In doing so, BWC use offers utility for assessing adherence to various policies by independent monitors, by researchers, and for self-monitoring purposes over the long term. Whereas police–citizen encounters are typically
analyzed indirectly (e.g., through officer/citizen statements or written reports), BWC
footage allows observers to view and analyze encounters as they unfold, thereby
enabling researchers to systematically measure key situational and transactional
aspects of police–citizen encounters (Makin et al., 2020).
Makin et al. (2020) demonstrate that BWC footage enables researchers to contextualize outcomes of police–citizen encounters and other social events of interest.
Researchers have recently leveraged such a benefit by using BWC footage to study a
range of policing topics, including negative emotional states in police–community
interactions (Makin et al., 2019), passenger aggression toward officers during citation
events (Friis et al., 2020), police–citizen interactions during traffic stops (Voigt et al.,
2017), opportunities for problem-oriented policing during routine police–citizen
encounters (Pollock et al., 2020), and the duration of police use of physical force
(Willits & Makin, 2018). Worden and McLean (2017) conducted an SSO of police incar camera footage to measure officer adherence to procedural justice principles during a random sample of police–citizen encounters in Schenectady, NY. Worden and
McLean’s (2017) analysis provides support for using remote observational methods in
the study of procedural justice.

Evidence-Based Policing (EBP) and the Role of Researcher–Practitioner
Partnerships
In Newark, NJ, there are several policies that can be assessed for compliance using
BWC footage. For instance, NPD BWC policy mandates that officers announce to
subjects the presence of the BWC—an activity that can be confirmed to have taken
place upon review of the video footage. With that said, although research suggests
consent decrees can be an effective method of police reform (Davis et al., 2005; Powell
et al., 2017), persistent and long-term monitoring of key outcome measures is necessary (Chanin, 2014). Police agencies with and without consent decrees may lack the
capacity to collect BWC data for self-monitoring and other purposes, and practical
challenges inherent in day-to-day policing commonly prevent the integration of
research and practice.
Researcher–practitioner partnerships have often been advanced as a vehicle for
better integrating EBP into police functions. Practitioners benefit from the analytical
expertise of their research partners in exchange for the data access necessary to
explore real-world problems, which can elude researchers outside of such partnerships (Piza & Feng, 2017). The analytical benefits to researchers vary in scope and
have the potential to inform performance monitoring activities. Braga (2010, p. 177)
speaks to the need for academics to provide practitioner stakeholders with “strategic
information products” and communicate their importance to police officials in a
range of venues (Braga & Davis, 2014). Within such an arrangement, strategic information products may differ from the experimental and quasi-experimental evaluation
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research typically privileged in EBP as outcomes represent only one of many important pieces of information that police require (Greene, 2019). Sparrow (2011) noted
that exploratory and descriptive methods commonly employed in natural science
inquiry may better inform the design of police strategies than program evaluation
efforts.
These types of practical research benefits may be especially likely to occur when
police agencies develop the internal capacity to generate scientific knowledge
(Sherman, 2013). Although different models have been advanced to support a move
toward such police-led science (Piza et al., 2020), prior accounts suggest that benefits
are maximized when the line between researcher and practitioner becomes blurred. In
recognition of such benefits, embedded criminologists (ECs) (outside academic
researchers taking an active role in the day-to-day routine of public safety agencies)
have been increasingly incorporated in policing (Braga, 2013; Braga & Davis, 2014)
following successful application of this model in corrections (Petersilia, 2008).
Researcher–practitioner partnerships and the EC model can be expanded further to
assist police agencies to monitor daily performance. For example, researchers and
police agencies can work together to determine adherence to many agency policies
using BWC footage as a data source, while building self-monitoring capacity.

Scope of the Current Study
This study was conducted in Newark, NJ. Newark is the largest municipality in the
state, with a population of more than 280,000 according to the most recently available
figures from the U.S. Census Bureau (2019). Blacks comprise nearly 50% of the population, with about 36% of residents identifying as Latino. In 2018, Newark had a violent crime rate of 733 per 100,000 residents, which is larger than the national average
for cities with populations of 250,000 and above (451.5 per 100,000) according to the
Uniform Crime Report (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2018).
In May 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division opened an
investigation into the NPD after receiving allegations of civil rights violations by the
agency. Following an initial investigation, a “findings letter” was produced by the
Department of Justice in May of 2014, alleging the NPD had been engaged in unlawful policing practices, particularly against Newark’s Black population, dating back to
2009. This investigation resulted in a Department of Justice consent decree which
required the NPD to adopt specific reforms to address the violations, including the
deployment of BWCs and revised policies on bias-free policing and use of force (U.S.
v. City of Newark, 2016). Given that the initial investigation found an unconstitutional
pattern or practice by the NPD in its use of physical force (U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division, 2014), the NPD partnered with the research team for the purpose of providing a detailed description of use of force events, and BWC footage
served as the data source. In carrying out this work, the potential of the BWC as a
performance monitoring tool became apparent.
To demonstrate the value of BWCs for performance monitoring, we explore one
research question:
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Research Question 1 (RQ1): How often do officers adhere to procedural justice
standards as described in NPD policy during use of force events?
In relying on SSO, we acknowledge that prior research conceptualizes procedural justice largely as a psychological measure reflecting citizen impressions of treatment by
the police (Reisig et al., 2007; Tyler, 2004). However, research has also noted that citizen perceptions of police actions can largely be affected by emotions and other contextual factors (Barkworth & Murphy, 2015; Braga et al., 2014), and that citizen
evaluations of police actions do not always match what officers actually do in the field
(Worden & McLean, 2017). As such, a large body of research has opted to measure
procedural justice in the context of police actions, specifically through SSO methods
(Mastrofski et al., 2010; McCluskey et al., 2019; Todak & James, 2018). Furthermore,
as discussed subsequently, the NPD identifies precise officer actions in their conception of procedural justice, as outlined in the revised policies. Therefore, this study is
particularly interested in procedural justice as defined by police policy, given the interest in BWCs as a performance monitoring tool. For these reasons, we conceptualize
procedural justice in terms of officer actions in this study.
It should be noted that NPD deployed BWCs in stages and this study reflects early
stages of BWC deployment. Mandatory consent decree training on several topics had
not been completed when some of the earlier use of force cases explored here took
place; and, while the use of force policy had not yet come into effect during the study
period examined here, timing of policy implementation is not relevant to the larger
goal of demonstrating the value of BWCs for performance monitoring.
To access the data required to carry out this work, we leveraged the role of the
“insider/outsider” (Petersilia, 2008). The principal investigator of the project was
employed as a crime analyst at NPD prior to becoming an academic. This previous
experience afforded him the legitimacy associated with being a policing insider, while
seeking data access as an academic outsider. We also benefited from the availability of
a researcher from a local university who was embedded at the NPD. During our project, this EC compiled and triangulated administrative datasets associated with the
BWC footage on behalf of the research team. Finally, the principal investigator met
with the NPD to request input on how the research could be conducted in a manner
most beneficial to their mission and goals. Through this action, we welcomed practitioner participation in the knowledge-generating process (see Crawford, 2017; Katz &
Huff, 2020) and the result is an information product that demonstrates the utility of
BWC footage as a tool for monitoring adherence to departmental policies around principles of procedural justice.

Method
Design and Sampling
This study is an SSO video data analysis of arrests captured on BWC by the NPD,
which involved police use of force. SSO is a systematic method of data collection
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developed by Reiss (1968, 1971) wherein data collection is independent of the phenomena being observed. Video data analysis, involving the analysis of preexisting
video footage, provides an innovative venue for SSO (Nassauer & Legewie, 2018). As
Nassauer and Legewie (2018) point out, video data analysis allows researchers to
observe and record “what the visual captures about situational dynamics of human
social life” (p. 136). Because video footage has the potential to capture and archive
entire events from various perspectives, it is an ideal data source for researchers seeing
to identify key situational factors of outcomes, events, and processes.
In establishing a sampling frame for this study, arrests emerged as being of particular interest. While the opportunity to behave in a procedurally just manner is presented
during all police–civilian encounters, the potential for use of force is presumed to be
much lower during non-arrest scenarios—as in the case of a member of the public asking for directions, for example. This is because, during the course of an arrest, police
must secure suspect compliance. Furthermore, while arrests bring a higher degree of
risk of use of force compared with other types of encounters, arrests also impact millions of people per year in the United States. More than 10,000,000 arrests by law
enforcement occurred in the United States in 2019 (FBI, 2019).
Similar to Mastrofski et al.’s (2010) description of an event as a social construct,
the unit of analysis for this study is use of force events during the course of an arrest,
which includes at least one instance of police use of physical force. Use of force events
include a period of time preceding and following the use of force incident(s), beginning when the officers are first visibly seen interacting with any involved parties (e.g.,
suspects, bystanders, or victims). The exception to this is cases in which the video
footage begins after police had already begun interacting with involved parties (see
Table 1).1 The end of the use of force event can be described as the time at which full
suspect compliance is secured, making the likelihood of physical force minimal. This
may include the period following an arrest, the time at which suspects were secured
within a patrol car, or the time at which the officers left the scene.
We focus on the 122 use of force events recorded by BWCs between December
2017 and the end of 2018. Thirty events were excluded from the analysis for a variety
of reasons. The most common reason for exclusion (n = 18) is that the use of force
event was not actually captured by BWC. In these cases, the BWC-equipped officer(s)
arrived on scene after force had been applied. In five cases, use of force occurred after
arrest processing—at either a police precinct or hospital. These cases fell outside our
sampling frame, which is use of force cases that occurred during the course of an
arrest. In these five cases, compliance had already been secured when force occurred.
Six cases were excluded either because the use of force only constituted the application of handcuffs (n = 3) or because the internal affairs unit was actively investigating
the cases (n = 3), thus restricting access to the video from NPD servers pending the
conclusion of the investigation. Finally, a single incident was incorrectly tagged as two
events in the BWC database.
The final sample consists of 91 cases. In 50.55% (n = 46) of cases, the highest level
of force used during the event is hard, empty hand control and, in 36.26% (n = 33) of
cases, the highest level is soft, empty hand control (see Table 1). In 7.69% (n = 7) of
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Table 1. Frequency and Percent Procedural Justice Indicators.
Variables
Event in-progress
when camera
activated
Highest level of
force used

Announce presence
of BWC
Provide reason for
being on scene
Explain why
detained
Allow suspect speak

Address suspect
concerns
Officer verbally
antagonistic
toward suspect
Calm command

Suspect compliance
with first calm
command
Shout command

Suspect compliance
with first shout
command
Procedural justice
scale

Note. BWC = body-worn camera.

No
Yes
Total
Soft-hand control
Hard-hand control
Chemical device
Threat of lethal force
Total
Unconfirmed
Confirmed
Total
Unconfirmed
Confirmed
Total
Unconfirmed
Confirmed
Total
Unconfirmed
Confirmed
Total
Unconfirmed
Confirmed
Total
Unconfirmed
Confirmed
Total
Unconfirmed
Confirmed
Total
Unconfirmed
Confirmed
Total
Unconfirmed
Confirmed
Total
Unconfirmed
Confirmed
Total
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Total

Frequency

%

55
36
91
33
46
5
7
91
53
38
91
63
28
91
52
39
91
14
46
60
15
45
60
58
33
91
20
71
91
54
17
71
42
49
91
38
11
49
9
7
13
9
13
16
13
11
91

60.44
39.56
100
36.26
50.55
5.49
7.69
100
58.24
41.76
100
69.23
30.77
100
57.14
42.86
100
23.33
76.67
100
25
75
100
63.74
36.26
100
21.98
78.02
100
76.06
23.94
100
46.15
53.85
100
77.55
22.45
100
9.89
7.69
14.29
9.89
14.29
17.58
14.29
12.09
100

10

Criminal Justice Policy Review 00(0)

cases, the highest level of force is threat of lethal force and, in 5.49% (n = 5) of cases,
it is use of a chemical device (i.e., pepper spray). There are zero instances of either
blunt object impact or deadly force.2 These findings are consistent with statistics
reported from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ 2018 Police–Public Contact Survey,
which found that chemical agents and pointing or shooting of a firearm were much less
common than lower levels of force (Harrell & Davis, 2020).

Coding and Measurement
In-depth footage reviews have become a common method of focusing research involving video data (Nassauer & Legewie, 2019). As such, prior to beginning data collection, the authors met for a 5-day data retreat to review video footage. Due to
technological limitations preventing coders from viewing the video footage remotely,
a single coder was responsible for data collection and tests for intra-coder reliability
were conducted.3 The central coder of this project engaged in training during the data
retreat. Coding occurred at NPD headquarters across 8 months and it took approximately 300 hr to review and code all use of force events. In SSOs of video data, naive
realism refers to the notion that anyone observing the same video data will arrive at a
shared conclusion (Morrison, 2017). Observations are not independent of the observer
and, in Finlay’s (2002) discussion of reflexivity as intersubjective reflection, she notes,
“Psychodynamic researchers remind us to explore how conversation or text affects us
and to reflect on what we bring to it ourselves” (p. 217). Thus while prior SSOs have
included a single coder when appropriate (e.g., Porter et al., 2018; Sytsma et al., 2020),
we acknowledge that the results presented here owe to the positionality of a single
coder.
Despite relying on a single coder, to maintain a team approach to the coding
(Lindegaard & Bernasco, 2018), members of the research team were consulted
throughout the process to discuss issues related to the coding and to reach consensus
on appropriate codes. This exercise was crucial as scenes can quickly escalate from
calm interactions with few people, to chaotic and frenzied with multiple bystanders,
multiple suspects, officers arriving on scene at different points, foot and vehicle pursuits, and emotionally-difficult to view situations. In contrast to the frenzied nature of
the action depicted on video, despite video resolution limitations found in other video
data research (e.g., Keval & Sasse, 2010), video and audio quality seldom proved
problematic over the course of this research. Because NPD requires all officers to wear
BWCs, we often had various vantage points of a single event. In addition, microphones located in BWCs are close to users’ mouths, ensuring audio is relatively audible and clear.
Cases were coded for four procedural justice dimensions, as informed by the NPD
Bias-Free Policing policy, the updated use of force policy, and the newly developed
BWC policy (NPD, 2017, 2018a, 2018b). Several dimensions are consistent with prior
procedural justice literature, as is conceptualizing procedural justice as directly observable officer actions, rather than civilian perceptions (see Braga et al., 2014; McCluskey
et al., 2019; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004). Observing procedural justice indicators remotely,

Sytsma et al.

11

rather than through an in-person SSO is also consistent with recent developments in
the procedural justice literature (Worden & McLean, 2017). We coded (a) officer
announcement of BWC and operationalized this dimension as a binary variable: confirmed announcement of BWC/unconfirmed. Cases are “confirmed” if the coder
explicitly heard such an announcement in the video footage.
We also measured the extent to which (b) officers addressed suspect concerns, as
indicated by binary variables measuring whether or not officers can be confirmed (by
verbal indication audible to the coder) to have explained to suspects why they were
responding to the scene, why the suspect was being detained, whether the suspect can
be confirmed to have attempted to speak for the purpose of expressing their views, and
the number of times the suspect attempted to speak. We captured, of those who
attempted to speak, whether the officer can be confirmed to have allowed the suspect
to speak on each occasion an attempt was made. We also captured whether the officer
addressed the suspect’s concerns by making attempts to answer suspect questions on
each occasion an attempt was made.
Another procedural justice dimension captured in these data is (c) officer displays
of verbally antagonistic behavior, such as shouting, berating phrases, or name-calling.
Officer displays of verbally antagonistic behavior are operationalized as a binary variable (confirmed/unconfirmed). The target of such behavior (i.e., suspect or bystander)
is captured, as is the number of occasions such behavior occurred during the course of
a use of force event.
(d) Nature of officer commands is captured by these data, and command types
include calm commands and shout commands. A calm command is a nonthreatening,
verbal command. Examples of a calm, nonthreatening verbal command include, “Let
me see your identification” and “Open your backpack.” That said, the focus is not on
the words used, but on the tone with which the command is delivered. A shout command is an increased volume (i.e., yelling) command. Again, the focus is not on the
words used, but on the tone with which the command is delivered. Both command
types are operationalized as binary variables (confirmed/unconfirmed) and whether
the suspect can be confirmed to have complied with the command (binary). The number of occasions each command type was given during the use of force event was also
captured.
Finally, to assess “central tendency” of use of force events, an 8-point procedural
justice scale was created, which combines many of the binary items described above.
Items were coded in the same direction, thus a higher score indicates a more procedurally just interaction. The following indicators are each valued at 1 point: announcement of BWC, explanation of why suspect was being detained, explanation of the
reason for responding to the scene, giving a calm command, allowing the suspect to
speak, and addressing concerns for those who attempted to speak. Cases in which
officers gave suspects a shout command without also giving a calm command were
given a score of 0 (cases in which this did not happen were given 1 point). These items
are highly reliable (α = .8). Officer displays of verbally antagonistic behavior was not
included in the scale. Based on eigenvalues and Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measures of
sampling adequacy, this indicator is conceptually different from the other procedural
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justice indicators (KMO = .38).4 In contrast to the items listed above, it may be that
verbally antagonistic behavior is representative of the personality and demeanor of the
individual officer, independent of policy-level directives. All results are presented as
descriptive statistics.

Results
Officer Announcing BWC Presence
An officer can be confirmed to have announced the presence of a BWC in 38 cases
(41.76%; see Table 1). In 10 of the 38 cases in which an officer announced the presence of a BWC, the officers are visibly seen interacting with involved parties immediately when the video begins, indicating that the event was already in-progress when
the camera was activated. Similarly, in 26 of the 53 cases in which BWC announcement is not observed, the interaction was already in-progress when the footage began.
Thus, it is possible that BWC announcement occurred in as many as 64 (70.33%)
cases. Generally, this more liberal estimate should be considered low policy compliance. However, in the case of Newark, because BWCs were deployed in stages with a
likely adjustment period needed for each new group of officers to be equipped with
cameras, compliance with the BWC policy based on these data can be considered
acceptable and may have increased since 2018.

Officer Addressing Suspect Concerns
In 30.77% (n = 28) of cases, an officer can be observed providing a reason to the
suspect as to why the officer was on the scene (see Table 1). In the 63 cases in which
there is no evidence of an officer providing a reason to the suspect as to why the officer
was on the scene, 31 events were in-progress when the camera was activated. In other
words, the percentage of cases in which a reason is provided to the suspect may be as
high as 64.84%; but even this liberal estimate suggests that in more than one third of
incidents officers were not following the Bias-Free Policing policy. Because this policy was in place well prior to the study period, compliance with the policy is expected
to be higher.
In 42.86% (n = 39) of cases, an officer explained to the suspect why they were
being detained (see Table 1). Of the 52 cases in which there is no evidence of such an
explanation, 24 events were in-progress when the camera was activated. Thus, it is
possible that as many as 63 or 69.23% of events include an officer explaining to the
suspect why the suspect was being detained. Because such a directive can be found in
the updated use of force policy, which was not officially in effect during the study
period, if the most liberal estimate of policy compliance is accurate, policy compliance
can be considered satisfactory. However, as the purpose of this article is to demonstrate the potential of BWCs for performance monitoring, the timing of policy implementation is not entirely relevant.
In 65.93% (n = 60) of cases, the suspect attempted to speak for the purposes of
expressing their views at least once during the event and, in 76.67% of those cases, an
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officer allowed the suspect to speak (see Table 1). Of the 60 cases during which a
suspect attempted to speak for the purpose of expressing views, in 75% of cases, a
police officer addressed the suspect’s concerns by making attempts to answer any
questions posed by the suspect (see Table 1). Because the directive to answer suspect
questions comes from the Bias-Free Policing policy—which was disseminated prior to
the study period, this level of compliance with the policy can be considered unsatisfactory. However, of the 60 cases wherein a suspect attempted to speak for the purpose of
expressing views, in 24 cases, the suspect made a second attempt to speak (table not
shown). Of these 24 cases, 17 were permitted to speak and all 17 had their concerns
addressed by police. Of the 24 cases wherein suspects attempted to speak on two occasions for the purpose of expressing their views, 12 attempted a third time to speak. Of
those 12 who attempted to speak on a third occasion, all were permitted and 10 had
their concerns addressed by police. Several suspects continued to attempt to speak for
the purpose of expressing their views after this third attempt.
Results suggest that, with additional attempts to express views, suspects become
more persistent or committed to sharing their perspective and police may be less
receptive to allowing suspects to express their views. Although compliance with the
Bias-Free Policing policy is low for first attempts, with repeated attempts by the suspect to speak, those officers who permit suspects to speak are consistent in their adherence to procedural justice principles in that they tend to address suspect concerns.

Officer Verbally Antagonistic
In 36.26% (n = 33) of cases, at least one officer displayed verbally antagonistic behavior toward the suspect (see Table 1). In nine cases, there was a second instance of
verbally antagonistic behavior and, in two cases, there was a third instance of an officer displaying verbally antagonistic behavior toward the suspect (table not shown).
These results indicate low compliance with the Bias-Free Policing policy, which calls
for officers to “Be courteous, respectful, and professional” (NPD, 2017, p. 4).

Nature of Officer Commands
In 78.02% of cases, an officer gave the force recipient a calm command (see Table 1).
The use of force policy, indicating officers must use verbal commands to de-escalate,
officially came into effect after the study period; thus, had the policy been in place
sooner, these results might point to a low level of officer compliance with the policy.
Given the timing of the updated use of force policy implementation, the number of
officers already relying on calm directives toward suspects is encouraging.
Suspects complied with the calm command in 23.94% of cases (see Table 1). In
other words, suspect compliance with an officer command is low. In many cases, there
were several sets of calm commands. Two sets of commands were observed in 37
cases (table not shown). In 35.14% of cases with a second set of calm commands, the
suspect complied with the command. In 10 cases, there was a third series of calm commands. In 40% of cases with a third series of calm commands, the suspect complied.
Five cases involved more than three sets of commands. In addition, of the 71 cases
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Figure 1. Histogram: Distribution of procedural justice scale.

where a calm command was given, 59.15% (n = 42) resulted in use of force greater
than soft-hand control, compared with 80% of those cases where no calm command
was given (table not shown).
In 53.85% of cases, an officer gave the force recipient a shout command (see
Table 1). It should be noted that of the 49 shout command cases, most (77.55%) also
included at least one calm command. Suspects complied with the shout command in
22.45% of cases (see Table 1)—again, suspect compliance with officer commands is
low. In 10 cases, a second series of shout commands took place (table not shown). In
40% of cases with a second series of shout commands, the suspect complied with the
command. There is one case with three occasions of commands. Finally, of the 49
observed instances of shout commands, 69.39% (n = 34) resulted in use of force
greater than soft-hand control, compared with 57.14% of those cases where no shout
command was given.
Results around commands suggest that, despite suspects often not complying with
commands, many officers are quite committed to the command directive itself, and
they are committed to remaining calm in their delivery of a command.

Procedural Justice Scale
As indicated by Figure 1 (see also Table 1), use of force events do trend toward more
procedurally just, with most of the sample (58%) scoring between 4 and 7 on the procedural justice scale. With that said, a substantial portion (42%) of events are below
the median, and nearly 18% of cases (n = 16) have a score of 0 or 1. These results
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paint a more general picture of officer actions relative to the specific indicators discussed above and suggest that officer conduct could be improved during use of force
events.

Discussion
This study capitalizes on a successful research–practitioner partnership to demonstrate
the utility of the BWC as a performance monitoring tool. Using BWC footage, we
provide a detailed description of the extent to which use of force events are otherwise
procedurally just as required by NPD policy. We feel that such methods can benefit
police reform efforts as prior research demonstrates the importance of persistent and
long-term monitoring of key outcomes (Chanin, 2014), particularly in the context of
federal consent decrees (Davis et al., 2005; Morgan et al., 2017; Powell et al., 2017).
Study results demonstrate that, in many cases, no reason was provided to the suspect as to why the officer was on the scene. With that said, although we find that many
officers involved in the use of force events explored here did not announce the presence of a BWC, and often no explanation was provided to the suspect as to why they
were being detained, it is possible that compliance with BWC and use of force policy
on these indicators has improved since 2018. In most (78%) cases, an officer gave the
force recipient a calm command and, in just over half of cases, an officer gave a shout
command. In most cases of shout commands, calm commands were also given. This
indicates most officers adhered to the NPD policy of using escalating verbal commands before resorting to physical force. However, officers often did not attempt to
answer questions posed by suspects unless suspects persisted in their inquiries. It was
also quite common for at least one officer to display verbally antagonistic behavior
toward the force recipient. Finally, when procedural justice is operationalized more
generally using a procedural justice scale, while most (58%) events are somewhat
procedurally just in nature, officer conduct could be improved during use of force
events. Of particular concern is the 18% of cases that have a score of between 0 and 1
on the procedural justice scale.
Many officer actions observed through this research violate the Bias-Free Policing
policy and would have violated the updated use of force policy had it been officially
in effect during the study period. Observed policy violations could compound the
legitimacy-eroding effects of the use of force incident and this can have negative consequences for criminal justice and civic engagement (Kirk & Matsuda, 2011; Kirk &
Papachristos, 2011). That said, NPD procedures for responding to policy violations for
corrective and accountability purposes are quite comprehensive, and responses vary
depending on the perceived severity of the policy violation (see Office of the Attorney
General, 2017). Furthermore, while under federal consent decree, the Consent Decree
and Planning Division of NPD conducts internal audits and can also forward incidents
to internal affairs. The existence of this auditing unit speaks to questions about how
monitoring duties can be fulfilled once consent decrees expire. Prior research on
CCTV cameras has shown that implementing cameras without a succinct number of
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dedicated monitors can compromise intended effects (Piza et al., 2014). NPD and
other police agencies interested in capitalizing on BWC deployment for performance
monitoring should consider implementing a unit dedicated to actively observing BWC
footage for adherence to departmental policy.
In addition, should police agencies wish to exploit BWCs for monitoring policy
adherence, such an endeavor can be built into existing police practices. For example,
following NOPD’s success with monitoring consent decree compliance, the department
expanded the scope of accountability captured by the existing CompStat model, which
had traditionally relied on crime-related measures for performance management
(Morgan et al., 2017). NOPD’s new performance management approach monitors a
wide range of organizational activities and outcomes, including response time, misconduct, and investigatory activities. We advocate that officer conduct identified though
BWC monitoring be tracked by performance management systems, such as CompStat.
Although this study demonstrates the utility of the BWC as a performance monitoring tool, the limitations of relying on BWCs for performance monitoring mirror limitations of BWCs in general, and include unreliable hardware such as inoperability in
extreme cold temperatures (see Hung et al., 2016); equipment, data storage, and labor
costs (Letourneau, 2015); concerns around third-party vendors’ access to video evidence (S. E. Wood, 2017); subjective interpretation of video footage (Williams et al.,
2016); and many more (see Laming, 2019). Limitations specific to performance monitoring include the costs and challenges around creating and maintaining a dedicated
auditing unit, and challenges and costs associated with developing data tracking infrastructure. We further recognize that our study focuses on the first year of NPD’s BWC
program and federal government oversight through the consent decree. In the time
since, the NPD has implemented strategies aimed at improving police–community
relations, including officer training, increased public outreach in the form of regular
community meetings, and the solicitation of community feedback on the BWC program. As such, it is possible that our measures of procedural justice policy adherence
are specific to the study period and not reflective of current officer behavior in Newark.
Future research can apply SSO to BWC footage to determine how officer adherence to
procedural justice standards change over time.
As Terrill and colleagues (2016) point out, BWCs “rely on officer activation, which
does not occur equally for all citizen encounters and fails to capture events preceding
activation, which is a problematic gap” (p. 67). To control for this, where possible, we
present liberal estimates of results that account for cases in which the event was inprogress when the camera footage began. In addition, similar to the work of Tyler and
Wakslak (2004), the procedural justice scale created here is fairly simplistic in nature
and does not differently weight various actions. Finally, as in the work of McCluskey
et al. (2019) and Worden and McLean (2017), we rely on officer actions to indicate
adherence to procedural justice principles. This approach does not account for the
perceptual nature of procedural justice. A survey of arrestee perceptions of the police–
citizen interaction would more directly measure public perceptions of procedural justice. However, because the purpose of this article is to demonstrate the utility of BWCs
as a performance monitoring tool, data collection of arrestee perceptions is beyond the
scope of this work.
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Despite limitations, this work contributes a novel application of BWCs. Lum and
colleagues (2020) have shown that BWCs are unlikely to impact a range of police and
citizen behaviors. That said, the benefits of officer fidelity to procedural justice principles have been displayed in the literature (Mazerolle et al., 2013; G. Wood et al., 2020),
and video footage has been leveraged by researchers to observe the occurrence of procedurally just activities during police–citizen interactions (Worden & McLean, 2017).
We exploit BWCs to provide a detailed description of the extent to which use of force
events are procedurally just, thereby highlighting the potential of BWCs as tools for
monitoring adherence to a variety of policies. Ours is a notable contribution, given that
performance monitoring is key to achieving lasting reform and reducing legal cynicism
(Chanin, 2014; Davis et al., 2005; Morgan et al., 2017; Powell et al., 2017; Sampson &
Bartusch, 1998). It is our hope that this information product will persuade readers to
reimagine performance management. Police departments are encouraged to employ
creative approaches to monitoring a range of activities and outcomes.
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Notes
1.
2.
3.

4.

There are 36 such cases in this study.
The force typologies were informed by the use of force continuum, as presented by the
National Institute of Justice (2009).
To test reliability, 10% of cases were randomly selected and recoded r months after the
original coding commenced. Kappa coefficients confirmed the reliability of all coding for
this study, with all coefficients >0.06 (see Landis & Koch, 1977). Given space constraints,
reliability test findings are not presented in text but are available from the authors upon
request.
See Kaiser (1974) for guidelines to interpreting KMO values.
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